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In this paper, we propose to use the decoy-state technique to improve the security of the 
quantum key distribution (QKD) systems based on homodyne detection against the photon 
number splitting (PNS) attack. The decoy-state technique is a powerful tool that can significantly 
boost the secure transmission range of the QKD systems. However it has not yet been applied to 
the systems that use coherent detection. After adapting this theory to the systems based on 
homodyne detection, we quantify the secure performance and transmission range of the resulting 
system. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard first 
proposed the quantum key distribution to 
achieve perfect security in optical 
communication systems [1]. The security in 
these systems does not have the presumption 
of the eavesdropper’s limited computational 
power unlike the conventional cryptographic 
methods and it only relies on the principles 
of the quantum mechanics and the physics 
of the channel. 
However, a series of attack scenarios can 
be assumed against QKD systems and need 
to be addressed, including the individual 
attacks, the third party attacks and the PNS 
attack. 
Lütkenhaus et al. analyzed the security 
of the QKD systems against the individual 
attacks [2]. However, this security analysis 
is only valid for the QKD systems that use 
the so-called standard photon counting 
detection method. Another category of the 
QKD systems uses the homodyne detection 
instead of photon counting and requires 
specific security analysis that was first 
addressed by Namiki and Hirano [5]. 
The next step is to consider the third 
party attacks. These attacks exploit the basis 
dependant flaws in the source and the 
detectors of the practical QKD setups. The 
Gottesman, Lo, Lütkenhaus and Preskill 
(GLLP) group presented a complete analysis 
of the QKD system  [6] which had 
considered both the individual attacks and 
the third party attacks and resulted in a 
tighter bound on the secure transmission rate 
compared to the bound found by Lütkenhaus 
et al.  
Finally, the most powerful attack that we 
can assume against the QKD systems is the 
PNS attack. The PNS attack exploits the fact 
that the usual weak coherent state (WCS) 
sources may send multiple photon pulses 
instead of single photon pulses that was 
assumed in the theory. The decoy state 
technique has been proposed to overcome 
this specific type of attack [11]. The effect 
of the PNS attack on the QKD systems using 
photon counters has already been analyzed 
and the decoy state technique has been 
applied to them to improve their security. In 
this article, we address this problem for the 
homodyne detection based systems. Our 
practical setup uses optical homodyne 
detection which is a special type of the 
coherent detection allowing a single 
quadrature measurement of the optical field 
and therefore a limitation by the zero point 
fluctuation entering in the signal port. We 
first measure the impact of the PNS attack 
on the security of the system. Then, we 
apply the decoy state technique to improve 
the secure performance of this QKD system 
against this attack. 
In section II, we first review some of 
basics of the homodyne detection. Next, we 
recall the mechanism of the PNS attack and 
its impact on the security of the system in 
section III. Then, in section IV, we present 
the decoy state technique and apply it to our 
system which is based on homodyne 
detection. The section V is dedicated to our 
experimental setup and our measurements. 
Eventually, we make a conclusion in section 
VI and give some remarks on our results and 
the future perspectives. 
II. HOMODYNE DETECTION 
Traditionally, the photon counters are 
most often used in QKD systems because of 
their capability of operating in low signal 
levels. We use the homodyne detection 
instead because of its advantages over the 
photon counting, most importantly its better 
quantum efficiency in the optical 
communication systems wavelength, its 
ability to deal with the phase encoded 
signals at very high clock rates, its thermal 
noise free operation as far as a strong local 
oscillator is available and its lower cost. 
The quantum bit error rate (QBER) in 
homodyne detection can be obtained from 
the equation (1) [7]. 
( )ηµ25.0 erfce =  . (1) 
where η is the channel efficiency and can be 
calculated for any given channel length, ℓ , 
and the attenuation coefficient of the 
channel, α; i.e. ℓαη −=10 . µ is the average 
number of photons per pulse.  
For the WCS systems, the typical value 
of QBER in homodyne detection is higher 
than the one typically found in the photon 
counting and it results in a lower 
performance. However, we can improve this 
QBER by using a double symmetrical 
threshold decision discarding weak signals 
[8], equation (2). 
[ ])1(25.0 xerfce += ηµ . (2) 
In equation (2), x is the normalized value 
of the threshold; i.e. we normalize the 
average level of the receiving signal to one. 
 The drawback to this change in the 
decision threshold is that we abandon a 
portion of the receiving qubits with the 
following bit rate, bit abandonment rate 
(BAR). 
[ ] exerfca −−= )1(25.0 ηµ  . (3) 
Therefore, in practice, we need to make 
a compromise between the BER and BAR in 
order to get the optimum information 
throughput. 
III. PHOTON NUMBER SPLITTING  
In the basic BB84 protocol, Bennett and 
Brassard assumed a perfect single photon 
source. However, this type of light source 
has been out of reach up to now and in 
practical setups, we use the WCS laser 
sources with approximately a Poissonian 
photon number distribution (PND). This 
special shortcoming of the practical systems 
makes them vulnerable against the photon 
number splitting (PNS) attacks. 
In order to perform the PNS attack, the 
eavesdropper needs a non-demolition photon 
counter [9] to determine the number of 
photons in each pulse without disturbing its 
quantum state. Then, the optimum strategy 
is to block all single photon pulses and to 
steal one or more photons from the multi-
photon pulses in order to get the full 
information on the key. 
This attack clearly adds up some extra 
loss to the receiving signal. If this added loss 
is not compensated by Eve, it will change 
the QBER and therefore the PND at the 
Bob’s end and the attack can be detected by 
Bob. 
Thus, Eve needs to compensate this 
added loss by replacing the whole or a part 
of the transmission medium by a superior 
channel with a lower attenuation. We 
assume a replacement by a perfect channel 
with no attenuation, at the worst case. She 
should also maintain the Poissonian PND. 
It has been shown that the PNS attack is 
detectable, if the following inequality holds 
true [10]. 
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For the numerical values of 65.1=µ and 
21.0=α , we find the maximum channel 
length of only 1.24 km independent of the 
type of the QKD system and the detection 
scheme, which is clearly not enough for the 
practical systems.  
But, we should also consider the other 
types of attacks. In general, the secure 
transmission rate in any QKD system can be 
found from the following equation. 
ppDpqR η..= , (5) 
where 5.0=q for the standard BB84 protocol 
and the detection probability, Dp can be 
easily calculated for the Poissonian source; 
i.e. )exp(1 ηµ−−=Dp . It is only the third 
factor ppη , called the post processing 
efficiency, which makes all the difference 
among the QKD systems. 
 According to the GLLP security 
analysis, the secure value of the ppη  is equal 
to the maximum of 1η , obtained from 
equation (6), and zero  [6]. 
[ ]))1/((1)1()()(1 Δ−−Δ−−−= δδδη HHf ,
 (6) 
where Δ  is the detection probability of the 
multi-photon pulses over the overall 
detection probability ratio, i.e. DM pp /=Δ . 
The parameter δ is the QBER and the 
function )δ(f  is the efficiency of the error 
correcting code used in the post processing; 
we assume the typical value of 22.1)( =δf . 
The function H(.) is the standard binary 
entropy function. 
 Figure (1) displays the transmission rate 
as a function of the channel length for the 
case of the QKD system based on homodyne 
detection. As we can see, in this case, the 
GLLP bound is even more stringent than the 
bound imposed by the PNS attack. 
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Figure 1. GLLP transmission rate (R) for the 
homodyne detection system 
IV.  DECOY-STATE QKD 
 One powerful method to counteract the 
threat posed by the PNS attack against the 
QKD systems is the decoy state technique. 
We explain the idea behind the decoy 
state technique in a very simple way. While 
performing the PNS attack, the eavesdropper 
needs to maintain the QBER. Otherwise, the 
attack will be detected by the legitimate 
parties. Now, we randomly choose a portion 
of the qubits and send them with a different 
coherent state called the decoy state, several 
decoy states can also be used. 
At the end of the transmission, Alice 
announces publicly for each qubit if she has 
used the decoy state or the signal state. 
Then, Bob calculates the QBERs of the 
signal state and the decoy state. Since the 
signal and decoy states are randomly chosen 
and since two coherent states are non-
orthogonal, Eve can not distinguish one 
from each other and at best, she can 
maintain one QBER. So, Bob can detect the 
eavesdropping by checking both QBERs 
providing that they are reasonably apart. 
Now, by combining the decoy-state 
theory with the GLLP security analysis, we 
can find the secure transmission rate against 
individual attacks, third party attacks and the 
PNS attack, all at the same time. We can 
choose to either use the decoy state for the 
actual transmission of the data or to simply 
send dummy bits while using the decoy 
state. In general, the post processing 
efficiency for each state is the maximum of 
zero and 1η  obtained from the following 
equation. 
[ ][ ])(1)1()()()21(1 eHeHefa −Δ−+−−=η .
 (5) 
The term a21− , in the right hand side of 
the equation (5), is due to the BAR of the 
coherent detector with the displaced 
threshold. For the values of threshold less 
than one, the transmission rate resulted from 
equation (5) has the typical form of the 
figure (2) with a maximum transmission rate 
at zero channel length and a maximum 
channel length in which the transmission 
rate drops down to zero.  
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Figure 2. Secure transmission rate (R) vs. channel 
length (l) with 65.1=µ  and x = 0.9. 
Interestingly, with the detection 
thresholds higher than one we also observe a 
minimum channel length, figure (3). This is 
due to the fact that while the BER decreases 
by increasing x, the BAR increases. There is 
obviously an optimum value for the x that 
gives the highest bit rate. 
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Figure 3. Secure transmission rate (R) vs. channel 
length (l) with 65.1=µ and x = 2. 
Generally, by increasing the threshold, 
both the minimum and the maximum 
channel lengths increase (figure 4). For the 
thresholds lower than one, the maximum R 
always happens at 0=ℓ . However, for 
higher values of the threshold the best 
performance occurs at a particular channel 
length, also plotted in figure (4). We have 
drawn the maximum R for the values of 
threshold between 0 and 10 in figure (6). 
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Figure 4.  Minimum, optimum and maximum 
channel lengths, respectively from bottom to top for 
different values of threshold (x) 
In summary, the value of the threshold 
should be chosen according to the variations 
of the minimum and maximum channel 
lengths so that the actual channel length will 
be between these two bounds, with the best 
case being the channel length that gives the 
optimal performance. Furthermore, we can 
always increase the operational range of the 
Figure 5. Block diagram of the weak coherent pulse quantum key distribution system using balanced homodyne 
detection. EAM: Electro-Absorbent Modulator, PR: Polarization Rotator, OA: Optical Attenuator, PM: Phase 
Modulator (Mach-Zehnder type), C: 3 dB coupler, PC: Polarization Controller, PS: Phase Shifter, PBS: Polarization 
Beam Splitter (combiner), SMWC: Single Mode Wideband Coupler. 
system by increasing the threshold at the 
expense of a decrease in the transmission 
rate.  
Finally, we should add that if we choose 
to send the information by several coherent 
states, the overall transmission rate will be 
the sum of all bit rates each multiplied by 
the percentage of the qubits sent by the 
corresponding coherent state; e.g. 
2211 RpRpR += for two coherent states. 
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Figure 6. Maximum transmission rate (R) for the 
different values of the threshold (x) 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
For the experiments, we have used a 
QKD system based on homodyne detection 
that is implemented in our laboratory [8]. 
We tested the system for the short channel 
lengths (a few meters) to find its secure 
performance. Figure (5) shows the block 
diagram of our system.  
We set the value of the threshold at zero 
and performed a series of experiments for 
several values of µ. These results and the 
expected theoretical curve are shown in 
figure (7). We found the best performance at 
65.1=µ , which was used in all simulations 
along the paper. 
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Figure 7. Transmission rate (R) vs. µ  for the 
threshold at zero, x = 0 
This setup is an implementation of the 
standard four-state BB84 protocol via phase 
encoding. The interferometric structures in 
two sides are used to produce the reference 
pulse and the interference between the signal 
and reference pulses, respectively. At 
Alice’s side, the first interferometer also 
allows sending both the signal pulse and the 
reference pulse through a single channel by 
the means of a time division. This time 
division is compensated at Bob’s side by 
adjusting the lengths of the two arms of the 
second interferometer to let the interference 
happen. 
We compensate the phase instability that 
is introduced in two interferometers by the 
means of a feedback loop in the receiver. 
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The choice of the signal or decoy state is 
done at the EAM which is also used to make 
digital pulses out of the continuous laser 
beam. For a more detailed explanation of the 
setup, we refer the readers to the reference 
[8]. 
The value of µ in these experiments has 
been estimated using the phase photon- 
number uncertainty equation. 
2
1. ≥ΔΔ ϕn  . (6) 
The output of the laser source is 
approximately a coherent state with the 
Poissonian PND, For which, we have: 
( ) µ=Δ 2n  . (7). 
Now assuming the minimum uncertainty, 
i.e. the equality in equation (6), we have: 
 
ϕ
µ
Δ
=
2
1 . (8) 
The parameter ϕΔ  in equation (8) is the 
standard deviation of the detected phase and 
can be expressed in terms of the average 
value of detector output voltage (V) and its 
standard deviation ( ( )2VΔ ) as: 
VV /Δ=Δϕ  . (9) 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we demonstrated the 
application of the decoy state technique to 
the QKD systems based on homodyne 
detection to achieve the security against the 
PNS attacks. 
We calculated the performance of the 
system for a wide range of detection 
thresholds. From the results, we conclude 
that for low channel lengths (below 4 km), it 
is better to set the threshold close to zero. 
On the other hand, for a longer channel, 
higher threshold values result in a better 
performance. Eventually, for any given 
channel length, we can find the optimum 
value of threshold by a simple simulation. 
The experiments that we have performed 
are only for a very short channel length in 
which the attenuation is negligible, further 
experiments have to be done to validate our 
results for longer channel lengths which 
need more accurate devices. 
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